Resource impact on DOD Single Scope Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation initiative (SSBI-PR) by Verry, Thomas J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2002-06
Resource impact on DOD Single Scope Background
Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation initiative (SSBI-PR)
Verry, Thomas J.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5786




Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited 












 Thesis Advisor:   William J. Haga 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2002 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Title (Mix case letters) 
Resource Impact on DoD the Single Scope Background Investigation-Periodic 
Reinvestigation Initiatives 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Verry, Thomas J. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
      The resource impact of implementing selected changes to the Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) process was studied.  
The Phased Periodic Reinvestigation (Phased PR) and the Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES) initiatives were 
compared in terms of costs, schedule and performance with the current PSI process.  Estimated impact costs of the ACES 
process were determined using estimates from adjudicated cases and applying relevant investigative and adjudicative process 
costs to the ACES product.  The study found that ACES offers potential significant improvements in the performance of the 
PSI process by identifying issue-relevant cases earlier than the current PSI process.  ACES coupled with the Phased PR process 
could increase the number of issue-cases identified without additional resources.  The result would be a PSI process that has a 








15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 85  
14. SUBJECT TERMS:  Single Scope Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation, SSBI-PR, 
Top Secret Periodic Reinvestigation, TSPR, Automated Continuing Evaluation System, ACES 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
RESOURCE IMPACT ON SINGLE SCOPE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION-
PERIODIC REINVESTIGATIONS 
 
Thomas J. Verry 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.A., Iowa State University, 1991 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 















Approved by: William J. Haga,  
      Thesis Advisor 
 
 




            Douglas A. Brooks,  
Dean, Graduate School of Business  


























The resource impact of implementing selected changes to the Personnel Security 
Investigation (PSI) process was studied.  The Phased Periodic Reinvestigation (Phased 
PR) and the Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES) initiatives were compared 
in terms of costs, schedule and performance with the current PSI process.  Estimated 
impact costs of the ACES process were determined using estimates from adjudicated 
cases and applying relevant investigative and adjudicative process costs to the ACES 
product.  The study found that ACES offers potential significant improvements in the 
performance of the PSI process by identifying issue-relevant cases earlier than the current 
PSI process.  ACES coupled with the Phased PR process could increase the number of 
issue-cases identified without additional resources.  The result would be a PSI process 









































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii





A. PROBLEM .......................................................................................................1 
B. SOLUTIONS PROPOSED .............................................................................2 
C.  IF SOLUTIONS NOT IMPLEMENTED.....................................................2 
D. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................3 
E. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.....................................................6 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................7 
A. OVERVIEW.....................................................................................................7 
B. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS........................................................................8 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................13 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................17 
A. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH ............................................................................17 
IV. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................19 
A.        THE CURRENT SSBI-PR ANALYSIS.......................................................19 
1.   Cost............................................................................................................19 
2.   Schedule ....................................................................................................20 
3.   Performance .............................................................................................21 
B. PROPOSED PHASED PR ANALYSIS.......................................................22 
1.      Overview ................................................................................................22 
2.     Cost..........................................................................................................22 
3.     Schedule ..................................................................................................26 
4.     Performance ...........................................................................................26 
C. PROPOSED ACES PILOT STUDY ANALYSIS.......................................26 
1.     Overview .................................................................................................26 
2.     Cost..........................................................................................................27 
3.     Indirect Costs .........................................................................................27 
a.     Schedule ......................................................................................27 
b.     Assumptions ................................................................................29 
c.     How Many Aces Cases ................................................................30 
d.     How Aces Cases Are Handled ....................................................30 
e.     Handling/Adjudicative Costs ......................................................31 
f.     Impact Costs.................................................................................32 
4.     Schedule ..................................................................................................33 
5.      Performance ..........................................................................................33 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................37 
A.        CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................37 
1.       Overview ...............................................................................................37 
2.        Answers to Research Questions.........................................................37 
a.     What are the benefits to implementing Phased SSBI-PRs?......37 
 viii
b.     What are the risks with Phased SSBI-PR? ................................37 
c.     What are the benefits to implementing ACES? .........................39 
d.     What are the risks with ACES? ..................................................39 
a. Can combining Phased PRs and ACES produce benefits 
that outweigh the  risks? .........................................................39 
3.        Recommendations ...............................................................................40 
4.        Area for Further Research.................................................................41 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................43 
APPENDIX A:     EXTERNAL DATABASES ACCESSED BY ACES...........................47 
APPENDIX B:  ACES SAMPLE PRODUCT REPORT ...................................................49 
1. OVERVIEW...........................................................................................................71 
2. SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS ..............................................................................71 
a.     Data Sources ...........................................................................................72 
b.     Data Evaluation .....................................................................................72 
c.     Aces Product ...........................................................................................73 
d.     Cost Estimation......................................................................................73 
APPENDIX K:  DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS...............................................75 















I would like to thank Dr. Howard Timm and Dr. William Haga for their guidance, 
wisdom and help while supervising this project.  Also, I would like to thank Admiral 
McCarthy, John Mutty, Richard Doyle and Jerry McCaffery whose instructions and 
valuable insights were fundamental to prepare this project.   
Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Kamela, for her support during the long 
hours of work required to prepare this thesis and presentation.  Without her support, this 






























Secrets that affect national security are only as good as the people who keep them.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) personnel security system, which governs clearances 
and access to national secrets, has been remiss in its responsibilities to provide timely and 
accurate assessment of personnel who control those secrets. (GAO, 1999)  The key 
agencies responsible within the DoD have had intense pressure to correct the problems 
contributing to why the personnel security system has not been able to deliver its 
personnel security product in a timely and reliable manner.  The long-term solution to the 
problem of backlogs of investigations is still unclear, but the status quo delivery of 
investigations and clearances cannot continue because it threatens National Security 
(GAO, 1999).  
The federal government uses personnel security investigations to determine 
whether an individual should be granted access to classified information.  Because these 
investigations are the critical first step in safeguarding national security information, it is 
imperative that the system of personnel investigations remains credible and reliable.  The 
personnel security investigation process has not maintained the standards set by the 
President of the United States.   GAO concluded that deficiencies in the personnel 
security investigation process posed a risk to national security. (GAO, 1999)  The 
breakdown of the personnel security system precipitated studies to seek ways to improve 
the personnel security investigation process.  In addition to research addressing the 
productivity of sources required for investigation, other studies revealed that the 
personnel security clearance system has been maintained with little regard to the cost-
effectiveness of the total system. (Heuer, 2001)  Because the personnel security system is 
to a large extent governed by federal guidelines and thus under political decision making 
rules, substantially changing the system has been considered next to impossible. (Joint 
Security Commission, 1994, 1999)   The personnel security system has not been able to 
conduct timely clearances or investigations, as evidence by the backlog by GAO. (GAO, 
1999)  The common recommendation of the various studies is to implement immediate 
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changes to fix the Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) system, which is resistant to 
change.  The problems with the personnel security clearance process are easier to assess 
than they are is to correct, but rational decisions, using accepted risk management 
approaches, must be employed if the system is to maintain its effectiveness.  The use of 
automated data systems to replace manual collection processes has been routinely 
accepted as progress in business and government alike, and the personnel security system 
should be no exception.  Failure to adopt rational and reliable standards for the personnel 
security system will compromise the progress of national security vice defend it.   The 
solution to the process incorporates finding savings where appropriate and reinvesting 
them in improved processes when applicable. 
B. SOLUTIONS PROPOSED 
The PSI process needs to change.  The resources spent investigating unproductive 
information sources on people who show no signs of misconduct is costing millions of 
dollars.  The PSI process must follow mandated federal guidelines, but needs to be 
revised to better differentiate between subjects with issues from subjects without issues.  
In terms of the number of interviews and records checks conducted, both types of 
subjects are currently treated the same. This standard application of the guidelines is 
costly in time and resources.  The solution is to apply cost and productivity analyses to 
the PSI process and apply resources to those personnel who need the most attention.  
Personnel with issues of concern pose a greater threat to national security.  Cost benefit 
analysis and information source productivity analysis as proposed by some people and 
studies would allow for those resources to be used to improve the PSI process. 
C.  IF SOLUTIONS NOT IMPLEMENTED 
 If the PSI system follows the status quo and operates under guidelines that favor 
a “one size fits all” approach over productivity and results, the system will continue to 
lose credibility and effectiveness.  Following the same procedures of investigating 
subjects and issuing clearances without concern for the costs and productivity of the 
sources used is not good financial stewardship of public resources.  While the PSI system 
is governed in large part by federal guidelines, the process needs to adapt to changing 
technology and data gathering techniques and abandon those sources and techniques that 
produce very little results.  The mix of risk management and cost benefit analysis should 
3 
be a cornerstone in determining what sources and procedures delivers the best results for 
the PSI program. 
D. BACKGROUND 
The Defense Security Service (DSS) is the primary provider of background 
investigations for the Department of Defense (DoD).  While DSS is currently responsible 
for DoD security education and industrial security programs, the major product it delivers 
to the DoD is Personnel Security Investigations (PSIs).  Obtaining security clearances is  
a two-step process: investigation and adjudication.  Security clearances are the best 
assurances available, based upon personal information, that cleared personnel are not 
security risks and meet the requirements for holding positions of trust that expose them to 
sensitive or classified information.  The investigative product, typically performed by 
Special Agents (SAs) of DSS, contains personal information concerning an individual’s 
character, loyalty, emotional stability and reliability.  Adjudicators use the investigation 
results to determine if a person should be granted new or continued access to national 
secrets.  The information contained in the investigation report is a snapshot of a person’s 
past and serves as a predictor of the person’s future behavior. 
A member of the Armed Services, a DoD civilian or a DoD contractor must have a 
background check completed prior to unescorted entry into sensitive areas.  DSS 
conducts PSIs in accordance with Executive Orders 10450 (1953), 10865 (1960) and 
12968 (1997). These orders mandate that personnel assigned to sensitive positions with 
exposure to classified information be granted clearance access to that information only 
when an investigation into the person’s behavioral history affirms the individual is 
trustworthy and loyal to the United States. 
Major reviews of the PSI process in the mid-1980s revealed significant shortcomings.  
The Joint Security Review Commission, known as the Stillwell Commission (1985) and 
the The Joint Security Commission (1994) made several recommendations to further 
strengthen the PSI program.  One of those recommendations was that increased 
importance should be placed on the Periodic Reinvestigation (PR) of cleared personnel.  
The premise was based upon then recent espionage cases (e.g., John Walker, Aldrich 
Ames) where trusted individuals, with requisite clearances, were engaged in espionage, 
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and a PR may have detected signs of that espionage had a thorough and timely 
investigation PR been conducted.  PRs reaffirm an individual’s commitment to behave in 
a reliable and trustworthy manner.  They do so by reinvestigating sources from the 
original investigation in addition to seeking information from other more recent sources.   
Given that everyone receiving a PR has already had an initial background check, the 
PRs’ primary focus is not on providing a “whole person” benchmark.  The “whole 
person” concept considers all positive and negative aspects of a person’s background and 
manner of behavior in relation to the specific position or assignment considered. (Timm, 
1991)  It assumes that the while a person’s past behavior is the best predictor of future 
behavior, people change over time, and major life events drive those changes.  The PR 
tends to focus more on just one element of the whole person concept--trying to determine 
whether issues of concern have emerged that may reflect negatively upon the continued 
eligibility for clearance.  Given that people holding security clearances have already been 
“screened in,” it is more efficient to focus PRs on issues that might warrant their being 
“screened out” instead of also seeking positive information.  Unless significant 
derogatory information is found, there would be no reason to consider revoking a 
person’s clearance.  Additionally, PRs may have some deterrent effect on individuals 
who understand they will be subject to a PR in the future. 
Periodic Reinvestigations, as a whole, seldom result in revocation of security 
clearances for personnel currently holding them.  Negative adjudication from the Central 
Adjudication Facilities (CAFs) occurs in less than 3.8 percent of the PRs conducted, and 
in most of those situations the individual and/or command withdraws their request for 
request for clearance action, instead of the clearance being officially revoked. (Wiskoff 
and Fitz, 1991)   During periods when resources are scarce the tendency is to (a) shuffle 
resources to investigations that are needed to be conducted before people can be granted 
access to classified information and are more likely to detect issues of security concern 
and (b) curtail funding to those that are less likely to affect operations or reveal problems.  
Consequently, PRs have suffered ebbs and flows of funding priority within the DoD.  
Although PRs remain a critical element in the PSI process in part because of the potential 
negative consequences they help deter, priority and subsequently funding are always a 
challenge for PRs. 
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 The PR backlog problem caused by the DoD investigation process was 
highlighted in an October 1999 GAO Report.  It was described as threatening national 
security and estimated (at that point in time) at 600,000 backlogged PRs.  DoD and DSS 
cited several reasons for the backlog in their response to Congress, including 
miscommunication and failure to receive adequate resources to cover the new standards 
set by Executive Order 12968.  Executive Order 12968, issued in 1997, changed several 
investigation requirements that precipitated additional requirements on periodic 
reinvestigations.  DSS also cited the DOD’s previous quota on the number of PRs that 
could be submitted from service agencies and the incomplete implementation of the Case 
Control Management System (CCMS) as major factors in creating the backlog of PRs.  
Since the GAO reports, DoD has responded in much the same way as they did in the 
early 1980s, to fix the backlog with additional resources and oversight. The increased 
pressure to eradicate the backlog of PRs precipitated studies (e.g., Joint Security 
Commission, 1999, Defense Personnel Research Center, 1999, 2000, 2001) on how to 
help solve that problem. 
While it may be theoretically possible to investigate every aspect of a cleared 
person’s background, it would be prohibitively costly in time and money.  Given that the 
DoD has 1.2 million military and 1.2 million civilian and contractor personnel with 
various levels of clearances, it becomes a resources balancing act to manage all the 
necessary investigations.  Resources must be directed to those data sources that are the 
most productive in determining a person’s fitness for sensitive positions.  When 
originally established, DSS, (formally DIS) found a particularly good set of sources 
which was labeled the National Agency Check (NAC).  The NAC contained 
approximately four sources for information. These sources were considered one of the 
best sets of information available, but that situation has since changed.  Information 
exchange has evolved and so have the sources.  As predicted by Euske and Ward (1998), 
financial information found on credit reports and identified by computer analysis has 
helped to identify personnel with issue-relevant cases.  The access to personal financial 
information has become relatively inexpensive due largely to the availability of credit 
histories from commercial sources.   
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Which sources produce the most useful information?   The Source Yield Study, 
(Kramer, et al, 2000) provides insights regarding how useful different types of 
information are to the adjudicators. The study concluded that the best sources were often 
the least costly, and the poorest sources of information were sometime the most costly.  
This revelation led researchers to question the productivity of each source required under 
the current PSI standard. A subsequent study, Phased SSBI-PR, (Heuer et al, 2001) 
revealed that approximately 30 percent of the resources currently spent on SSBI-PRs only 
altered the designation of a case from non-issue to issue in two tenths of a percent of the 
total PRs conducted yearly. (Heuer, 2001)  This means that DSS is currently spending 
approximately 20 million dollars (FY03$) to identify 140 additional issue cases under the 
present PR process. (PBD, 2001)  The study found no situation where adjudicative 
actions developed from the least productive set of sources alone.  In terms of cost and 
benefit, there appeared to be a significant cost chasing very little benefit by continued 
review of those non-productive sources in all cases.  Although this finding provides an 
opportunity for a significant cost savings, to date there has been limited interest in any 
cost-cutting measure that results in an even modest performance degradation affecting 
national security.   Although one case in 500 seems insignificant in terms of increased 
potential for compromised secrets, the significance is magnified by the potential negative 
consequences if any one of those missed cases actually involved espionage.  
Consequently, researchers proposed to more than offset any performance decrements 
resulting from phased PRs by taking advantage of automated data and automated 
screening during the interval between PRs.    The Automated Continuing Evaluation 
System (ACES) pilot program, which commenced in December 2001, attempts to more 
than capture any potential marginal loss of performance the Phased PR process sacrifices 
using that approach. 
E. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS  
In order to help the reader understand the terminology used by the Defense 
Security Service, selected terms used in this report are listed in alphabetical order along 
with their definitions and abbreviations in Appendix K. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW  
DSS, officially chartered in 1971, has evolved into its present form as a result of 
several defense reform initiatives.  The latest evolution was in 1997 when the Defense 
Investigative Service (DIS) was renamed the Defense Security Services (DSS) and came 
under the direction, authority and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, (C3I)).  DSS has three primary 
business functions, (1) DoD security training and education, (2) industrial security 
programs and (3) its main function, conducting Personnel Security Investigations.  The 
PSI Program accounts for almost 60 percent of DSS’ budget and is by far the most visible 
business activity of DSS.  The mission of the PSI Program is to conduct background 
investigations on individuals assigned to or affiliated with the DoD.   
The PSI process consists of two distinct processes.  The first process, the 
investigation, obtains personal information concerning an individual’s character, loyalty, 
emotional stability, and reliability.  The second process, the adjudication, is completed 
for all DoD clearances by one of eight Central Adjudication Facilities (CAFs).  Specially 
trained adjudicators review the completed investigation products and make security 
clearance determinations based upon adjudication standards and investigation results.  
The specific levels of clearances granted are Top Secret (TS), Secret (S) and Confidential 
(C).  After the clearance is issued and the person is granted access, the individual who 
was investigated and adjudicated becomes entrusted with access to material, information 
and systems that are sensitive in nature.   
DSS employs approximately 2,500 people, including approximately 1200 Special 
Agents (SAs), located throughout the United States and Puerto Rico. (Cohen, 2000)  DSS 
closes approximately 140,000 personnel security investigations yearly, on a budget of 
approximately $150 million.  DSS conducts approximately 270,000 NAC-LCs, 45,000 
SSBIs and 50,000 SSBI-PRs yearly. (DSS, 2002) This accounts for about 40 percent of 
the personnel security investigations performed by the entire federal government each 
year. The Office of Personnel Management’s contract investigation service, United States 
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Investigation Service (USIS), also conducts about 40 percent, with the FBI and CIA 
splitting the remainder. (Cohen, 2000)    
As part of its core function, DSS conducts initial SSBI and Periodic 
Reinvestigation (PRs) as mandated by Executive Order 12968.  The primary purpose of 
the SSBI is to determine the person’s suitability to hold a clearance through examination 
of that person’s behavioral history.  The data sources used are those that provide the best 
information on a person’s character.  Executive Order 12968 requires that the derogatory 
information be viewed in context of the “whole person” and mitigating circumstances be 
considered at all times. (Carney, 2000)   The goal of the initial SSBI is to gather 
information that accurately reflects a subject’s past behavior.   
Although PRs use a majority of the same data sources, the purpose is slightly 
different.  The purpose of the PRs is to determine continued eligibility for the clearance 
through data sources that reveal any issue-relevant or negative information.  Because the 
person currently holds a clearance, the focus is to find issue-relevant information that 
could be of concern to adjudicators.  Greater scrutiny is placed on possible negative 
issues, and sources are screened for negative trends.  The PR’s intent is to find as much 
negative information as possible to capture any behavioral changes that may affect the 
adjudicator’s decision for clearance.   If negative information is found, then positive and 
mitigating information is sought.  If no negative information is found, then there is no 
reason to consider revoking the person’s clearance.  The PR process determines if cleared 
individuals still maintain character and behaviors consistent with other individuals 
entrusted with the care and handling of sensitive information.   The scope and frequency 
of the PR depends on an individual’s level of access eligibility. 
B. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS  
The Executive Branch derives its powers to protect access to sensitive 
information from one of five statues:  The Espionage Act, the National Security Act of 
1947, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Counter-intelligence and Security 
Enhancements Act of 1994 and the Freedom of Information Act.  The National Security 
Act directs the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and 
methods from unauthorized disclosure. The Atomic Energy Act protects information 
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regarding atomic weapons and nuclear material.  The Counterintelligence and Security 
Enhancement Act of 1994 amends the National Security Act and directs the President to 
develop uniform requirements for background investigations and access denial appeals.  
The Executive Branch formalized these powers to protect national defense information 
through the issuance of Executive Orders.  The first order issued by President Truman, 
followed by four revisions from Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan and Clinton, all amend 
the standards based upon philosophical and political differences. (Cohen, 2000)  In 
addition, Executive Orders 12968 (1997) and 12958 (1997) set uniform standards for 
federal investigative and adjudicative processes and established a uniform system of 
classification and declassification for sensitive information, respectively. (Cohen, 2000)  
DoD Regulation 5200.2-R establishes DoD personnel security policies, 
procedures, standards and guidelines for making personnel security determinations.  The 
objective of the personnel security investigation is to determine an individual’s eligibility 
for access to classified information and assignment to a sensitive or critical position.  The 
clearance process begins when an agency requests the security clearance by submitting a 
DD Form 1879 and a Standard Form 86.  The request is forwarded to DSS’s Operations 
Center in Linthicum, Maryland, where it is reviewed by case analysts and then distributed 
to one of 12 DSS operating locations throughout the United States.   
The DSS operating locations assign an investigator who seeks information in that 
geographic location about a subject’s loyalty, character, reliability, trustworthiness, 
honesty and financial responsibility. The background check may be conducted in several 
DSS operating locations simultaneously depending on where the individual seeking the 
clearance lived, worked or attended school. The investigations are conducted in 
accordance with DoD 5200.2-R and the DSS Personnel Security Investigative Manual  
(i.e., DSS Manual 20-1-M.)   
As investigative elements are completed, the field offices send the results back to 
the DSS Operations Center.  The case analysts process any additional data sources and 
forward the completed investigation to the appropriate adjudication facility.  Adjudicators 
review the investigative results and issue clearances based upon those investigative 
results in accordance with the Adjudicative Guidelines reflected in DoD 5200.2-R and 
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DCID 6/4.   The requesting agency is notified of the clearance approval, or in some cases 
denial.  If it was a positive decision the individual is eligible to be granted access to 
classified information commensurate with the clearance level granted.  PRs are conducted 
in a similar manner with the exception that the request is internally generated based upon 
a subject’s last investigation completion date.  
Before employees in government or industry can have access to national security 
information, they must undergo a background investigation to determine whether they are 
sufficiently trustworthy to hold a security clearance.  The length and complexity of the 
investigation is dependent on the type of clearance requested.  The higher the clearance 
requested, the more in-depth the investigation.  Top Secret clearance investigations are 
the most labor intensive and subsequently the most costly to complete.  DSS uses a 
weighted measurement to estimate the man-hours required to complete various 
investigations and the initial Top Secret investigations are approximately eight times 
more labor intensive than the standard National Agency Check with Local Agency and 
Credit Checks (NAC-LC). The NACLC is considered DSS’s standard man-hour 
measurement unit when making man-hour estimates.  Top Secret PRs (TSPRs), with 
slightly fewer required data sources, are four times more labor intensive than the NAC. 
(DAF, 2001)   
Before federal standards were introduced, each agency charged with sensitive 
information was responsible for establishing their own background investigation 
standards.  National Security Directive 63, issued by the White House in 1991, 
established the formal standards for a comprehensive single background check for all 
federal agencies.  Data sources and requirements were combined into a single unified 
standard, known as the Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI). (Cohen, 2001)  
This investigation became the benchmark for investigations within the federal 
government and the sources were considered the best available at the time.  Since 1991, 
more security relevant information has become available through government and 
commercial automated data systems.  According to Cohen (2000), the sources used today 
provide much better information than those used a decade ago.   
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The objective of the DoD PSI process is to determine the suitability of an 
individual holding a clearance to handle classified material.  An individual’s eligibility 
for a security clearance is based upon Executive Order 12968, which requires an over-all 
common sense determination based upon reviewing the sources that reveal the “whole 
person” in terms of (1) allegiance to the United States; (2) foreign influence; (3) foreign 
preference; (4) sexual behavior; (5) personal conduct; (6) financial considerations; (7) 
alcohol consumption; (8) drug involvement; (9) emotional, mental and personality 
disorders; (10) criminal conduct; (11) security violations; (12) outside activities; and (13) 
misuse of information technology systems. (Cohen, 2000)   The goal of the investigation 
is to understand the whole person, and this process has tended to require as much 
information as possible about a subject being investigated.  Consequently, the 
investigative sources used to extract information regarding the whole person include the 
following: (1) subject interview; (2) spouse interview; (3) vital information check; (4) 
national agency check; (5) financial review; (6) citizenship; (7) education verification; (8) 
reference interviews; (9) employment records/interview; (10) neighborhood interviews; 
(11) local agency check; (12) public records; and (13) treasury check.    
The DoD’s ability to comply with federal investigative guidelines for security 
clearances virtually collapsed during the late 1990’s.  With the release of GAO Report 
NSAID-00-12, in October of 1999, the level of scrutiny applied to DSS and Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, ASD 
(C3I), was intense.  The report charged that DSS’ investigations were incomplete, 
untimely and failed to meet federal standards.  Of particular interest was the number of 
backlogged Periodic Reinvestigations (PRs.) Since there was no automated system to 
accurately account for backlogged PRs, the number had to be estimated.  GAO estimated 
the number of backlogged PRs to be 505,000.  These were in addition to the yearly 
requirements for 50,000 or more TSPRs. (GAO, 1999)    
 Several reasons contributed to the collapse of the investigation process.  The 
causes included a 40 percent reduction in DSS personnel with no proportionate decrease 
in workload, failed implementation of the Case Control Management System (CCMS), 
implementing the more labor intensive NAC-LC standard for secret and confidential 
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clearances, and the implementation by ASD (C3I) of a quota for all DoD components that 
was considerably lower than the number of yearly PRs falling due.   
DSS has experienced a 24 percent decrease in the number of investigators since 
1991, while its actual workload has increased. (GAO, 1999)  When DSS changed the 
process for secret and confidential investigations to meet federal guidelines, the impact 
was felt directly by the investigators.  Changing from the National Agency Check (NAC) 
to a NAC with local agency and credit checks increased the number of issue-relevant 
leads on which the investigators had to follow-up.  The expansion rate of the new NAC-
LC was not offset with additional resources for DSS, (e.g., investigators). 
Additionally, in May of 1999, the quota system imposed in 1995 by the ASD 
(C3I) was lifted.  Originally imposed to improve investigation completion time for DSS, 
the restrictive quota of 40,000 secret and 42,000 top secret  PR investigations per year 
was well below what was needed by the DoD components and contributed to the backlog 
of PRs that were not submitted until 1999.  This number of backlogged PRs held by the 
DoD components came at the same time problems were arising from the newly installed 
Case Control Management System (CCMS.)   CCMS was a prematurely fielded 
information management system that did not have all the functional elements working 
when implemented.  The implementation caused confusion and generated additional 
workload problems for the DSS staff and the CAFs when investigative standards were 
changing and quotas were lifted.  The result was DSS was struggling to keep 
investigations flowing and having to prioritize and shuffle those cases with the highest 
priority.  The fact that incomplete PRs do not automatically result in clearance removal, 
affect their priority with the PRs typically being considered less critical than conducting 
initial SSBIs for personnel who would be unable to perform their duties without their 
needed clearance and access. 
Based upon Executive Order 12968 and recommendations from the Joint Security 
Commission (1994) federal policy now dictates that every person holding a clearance for 
classified information must undergo a periodic reinvestigation (PR) to determine 
continued fitness for handling this information. Following a modified standard, PRs are 
required for personnel holding Top Secret clearances once every five years.  While the 
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initial SSBI provides a baseline for new personnel, the PR encompasses checks of most 
of the same sources to assess consistency and identify any additional problems that may 
have surfaced since the last investigation.  The objective is to determine if a subject is 
still trustworthy and loyal enough to handle classified material.  Prior research suggests, 
and espionage cases of the mid 1980s and the 1990s confirm, that virtually all damaging 
espionage comes from cases that involve trusted individuals who had already been 
granted access to sensitive material.  It’s because of this that PRs are as critical in the 
maintenance of a solid information security program as the initial screening.  In addition 
to detection, PRs may also aid in terms of helping to provide a deterrent effect for those 
cleared personnel with access to sensitive information.  But with limited resources, every 
agency is forced to make difficult funding decisions.  While DSS conducted PRs under a 
mandated DoD quota sytem, the backlog of PRs grew until Congress launched its 
investigation in October 1999.  The next section of this thesis examines additional studies 
that were completed after the original congressional inquiry and assesses the potential 
impact of their recommendations in terms of cost, performance and schedule. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first study reviewed here, SSBI-PR Source Yield: An Examination of Sources 
Contacted During the SSBI-PR (Kramer et al), commonly referred to as the “productivity 
of sources study,” evaluated 4,721 SSBI-PR cases from four agencies. The study 
documented how the information from 4,721 cases was categorized and coded for further 
analysis.   
A second study, A New Approach to the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased 
Reinvestigation, is known as the ‘phased PR study.’  It concluded that 98.7 percent of all 
issue-relevant cases that were identified in a full PR were identified with only eight of the 
twelve data sources required in the PR.  Secondly, it compared the cost and usefulness of 
the individual investigation elements of the PRs.  The study reported that the top 
producing sources accounted for only 58 percent of the total cost of the PR.  Conversely, 
unproductive sources, such as the neighborhood interview, produced only 1 percent of the 
issue-relevant information while comprising 20 percent of the total PR cost.  These 
findings were consistent with the 1994 Joint Security Commission’s recommendations 
regarding unproductive sources of data. (JSC, 1994)  The phased PR study suggests that 
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changes in the PR investigation standard are both desirable and feasible.  The actual 
number of interviews conducted in issue-free cases and issue-relevant cases differed very 
little because the Investigative Standard requires a minimum number of interviews to be 
conducted.  The phased PR study supplied evidence that conducting interviews only 
when there is evidence from a selected subset of sources would eliminate costly 
interviews that have a marginal return of issue-relevant information. 
The Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) Database 
Matching Pilot Study, (Chandler, Timm, Massey, Zimmerman), conducted in 2001, 
assessed the potential value of providing additional database information to Special 
Agents.  The study highlighted the fact that many electronic data sources are currently 
not being made available for Special Agents review and identified the electronic sources 
that  provided the most issue-relevant information. 
The ACES Pilot Study, conducted by PERSEREC, commenced in December 
2001 and is scheduled to be complete by October 2002.  The study examines the 
usefulness of automated data sources and data analysis in identifying cases with issue-
relevant information.  The purpose of ACES is to systematically conduct automated 
checks of government and commercial databases to identify cleared personnel who 
appear to be engaging in acts of security concern in between regular personnel security 
investigations.  ACES will routinely check existing databases and identify personnel with 
issue-relevant information.  The primary benefit of ACES is the ability to identify cleared 
personnel with issue-relevant information and report the cases to the CAF before the 
regularly scheduled PR.  This pilot study is attempting to address the selection criteria for 
identifying cases of concern as well to examine how the cases are processed by the CAFs 
for validation of that criterion.  The cases identified with ACES will be processed 
through the CAF using normal adjudication guidelines.  Through use of automated data 
exchange, ACES could potentially check cleared personnel annually vice every five 
years.   
Within any agency there is a normal attrition of employees for a variety of reasons 
and, therefore, some employees never make it to their next five-year PR.  If the attrition 
rate over a five-year period for a Top Secret cleared population of 500,000 is 30 percent, 
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then approximately 150,000 of those 500,000 people will never have their next PR 
conducted.  Knowing that they will not be subject to further investigations would 
eliminate the deterrent value of PRs for those individuals.   
The ACES pilot study will quantify how many additional personnel have issues of 
concern identified by checking their records that would have been overlooked until the 
next scheduled PR.   Because ACES is a personnel security monitoring technique that 
will invariably identify some additional cases, this intent of this study is to assess the cost 
of ACES to the PSI process and the benefits received from using it. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH 
A review of the relevant literature helped determine the causes for the DoD and 
Defense Security Service SSBI-PR backlogs.  Relying primarily upon the following 
reports: GAO Report NAID-00; GAO Report NSIAD-00-65; GAO Report NSIAD-00-
148, GAO Report NSIAD-00-246; GAO Report 01-465; GAO Report NSIAD-00-215; 
DoD Inspector General Report D-2000-11, the PSI process was reviewed and assessed in 
terms of cost, schedule, and performance.   
Secondly, the following studies were reviewed:  SSBI-PR Source Yield: An 
Examination of Sources Contacted During the SSBI-PR (Kramer, et al, 2001); A New 
Approach to the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased Reinvestigation, (Heuer, et al, 2001); 
Database Matching Pilot Study. (Chandler, et al, 2001)   Each study recommended 
improvements to the current PSI process.  The recommendations in the Phased PR study 
were compared to the current PSI process in terms of cost, schedule and performance.  
Additionally, the performance of the ACES, which is being evaluated by a pilot study 
that is not scheduled for completion until October 2002, was estimated using an analysis 
of historical data from a previous study.  The ACES performance was estimated using a 
database of adjudicated cases and running sample screenings against that database to 
identify issue-relevant cases.  The selection criteria used to screen the data were similar 
to the criteria ACES will use to screen personnel in the external databases.  Based upon 
the estimated performance results of ACES, the costs were determined using current 
investigation and adjudication practices.  Several assumptions were made on how the PSI 
system would handle the ACES product since the program is still under development.  
The current and proposed PSI processes were compared to the anticipated costs of the 
ACES and a trade-off analysis was made highlighting the costs and performance of each. 
The study is limited to information relating to the Single Scope Background 
Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR) due to time and resource constraints, as 
well as to both the seriousness of the backlog associated the reinvestigations and the 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A.        THE CURRENT SSBI-PR ANALYSIS  
1.   Cost 
The primary cost associated with PRs is the labor needed to conduct them.   The 
labor involved to conduct a PR determines how costly an investigation becomes and is 
largely determined by how many interviews are performed and by how many issues  
surface which need further clarification.  The most direct route to estimating the costs is 
to estimate the individual elements of a PR.  PRs have two categories of elements: data 
sources and interviews.   Access to data sources such as credit histories, local criminal 
records and immigration records is inexpensive.  Access to those sources comprises about 
20 percent of the total cost of a investigation. (Heuer, 2001)  This leaves 80 percent of the 
cost of an investigation in interviews.   
Since each investigation is unique and solely dependent upon a subject’s past 
behavior, each investigation becomes a custom product for the adjudicators.  Although 
each investigation must follow a series of minimum standards addressed in DoD 5200.2, 
the expansion of each investigation is again a product of a subject’s past.  Consequently 
placing a price tag on the cost of a PR is difficult.  Historical costs are the best source for 
determining the cost range of PRs.   
DSS does not have an accounting system capable of determining the actual costs 
of PRs.  For budgetary purposes, DSS uses a relative weighting factor based upon a level 
of difficulty experienced by Special Agents conducting actual PRs.  The National Agency 
Check with Local Agency and Credit checks (NACLC) is the standard by which all other 
investigation types are measured in terms of difficulty and manpower.  The NACLC is 
considered to have a fixed impact on investigation costs due to the requirement to 
conduct local agency checks throughout the United States.  It is considered by DSS to be 
the best standard to compare other investigations to determine resource requirements.  
Based upon the DSS standard weighted relationship, a Top Secret PR is 4.85 times more 
costly or labor intensive than a NACLC and subsequently is 4.85 more expensive than a 
NACLC. (DAF, 2001)  Although the weighting standard is an estimate, actual costs and 
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reported spending plans place the actual costs of a TSPR at $1,581 (DSS, 2002) This 
nearly double the $875 the figure reported in the Air Force memorandum detailing the 
costs of the various DSS investigations. (DAF, 2001).  The May 2002 FY03 DSS 
spending plan estimates the costs of the TSPR at $1,591 (DSS, 2002) and is closer to the 
actual costs reported by independent contractors as reported in Table 1.  
FY03 
($) 


















Table 1.    Reported TSPR Costs (DAF, 2001) 
   
From the available information it is evident that the actual costs of the PR differ  
depending on the provider of the investigation.  In order to accurately compare these 
reported figures to each other, the assumption must be made that the investigative process 
and products are similar for all investigative providers.  For this analysis, the cost of the 
TSPR need not be precise, but a reasonable figure based upon the best available 
information which will be used to calculate potential savings from implementing the 
Phased PR.  Therefore, based upon all the available data, the cost of a TSPR is 
considered to be $1,500 and all cost savings calculations will be based upon that number.  
2.   Schedule 
Because PRs are labor intensive it not only drives the costs of the PRs, but the 
timeframe in which the product can be delivered.  The time required to complete an 
investigation is calculated from the date the security clearance request (SF-86) is received 
by the DSS Operations Center to the date the final investigation products are sent to the 
CAF.  DSS has goals for completion time based upon DoD components requirements.  






Percentage of Investigations Complete                               
Type of Investigation 75 % 90% 95% 
SSBI 240 days 276 days - 
TSPR 210 days 276 days - 
NACLC 114 days - 228 days 
Auto-ENTNAC - 30 days - 
Table 2.   DSS Completion Time Goals (DAF, 2001) 
 
 DSS has not always been able to maintain completion times within these goals.  
In 1994 the average completion time for TSPR was 149 days. (Joint Security Commision, 
1994)  By 1998, the average completion time for TSPR had risen to 204 days (GAO 
1999) and by April 2001, the average completion time was near 262 days. (IG 2001)   
Through the use of external agencies, namely OPM and private contractors, DSS has 
been able to bring the average TSPR completion time down to 200 days. (DSS, 2002)  
The reason for the improvement was the additional resources and oversight placed on 
DSS since the initial GAO report.    
3.   Performance 
Performance is the most difficult element to ascertain.  Because the intent of the 
PSI program is to uncover unsavory aspects of individual behavior through an invasive 
search of private information, the number of negative issues it uncovers measures its 
success.  The best sources are ones that deliver accurate and highly relevant negative 
information about some of our potential and current clearance holders. Some sources 
produce better results than others. (Heuer, 2001)  Organizations such as DSS are always 
faced with scarce resources and proper use of those funds requires prioritization of 
productive sources.  Because of the scarcity of resources, performance must be tied to the 
cost and schedule of the program.  Since the adjudicators are making a determination of 
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fitness to handle sensitive material based upon the relationship of issue-relevant data and 
future behavior, the PSI program that delivers the most relevant data to the adjudicator at 
the lowest cost is therefore better than the others that do so at higher costs.   Performance 
of the PSI process is based largely on controlling the costs and delivering timely 
investigative products to the CAFs.  The performance benchmark for the PSI process 
must include costs and schedule.  Since there is no wholesale rejection of the current 
system by ASD (C3I) or the customers who use the products, the current PSI system with 
current costs, schedules and performance is the standard by which to measure 
improvements. 
B. PROPOSED PHASED PR ANALYSIS 
1.      Overview 
As demonstrated by the phased pilot study results, there is value in prioritizing the 
PR in terms of productivity of data sources and the cost of those sources.  Table 3 has the 
individual elements required for the TSPR as reported by DSS. (Heuer, 2001)  Included 
in Table 3 are costs in terms of percentage of total cost of the TSPR.  The elements are 
categorized in terms of Phase I and Phase II according to the Phase PR Study 
recommendations.  The Phase I sources correctly identified 99.4 percent of all cases that 
had issue-relevant information in the final adjudication of the case.  Nine cases out of 
4,721 were not categorized as issue cases by screening the Phase I elements alone, but 
were later found to have issue-relevant information using the expanded Phase II 
investigation sources.  The study concluded that relatively few cases would have issue-
relevant information found in Phase II investigation sources that would not have been 
detected by an expanded investigation triggered by Phase I sources.  One case in 500 
would have issue-relevant information in Phase II sources but none detected in Phase I 
sources. 
2.     Cost 
The Phased PR study illustrated that savings could be realized by implementing a 
Phased approach to the PRs.  Because the Phase I sources identified 99.4 percent of all 
cases having any issue-relevant information, the resources spent on Phase II sources 
became unnecessary for the many of the cases.  The individual elements of the PR and 
associated costs reported in the DSS’ cost study calculated the manpower required for 
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each type of records check and interviews conducted.  The figures were based on actual 
cost data submitted by SAs in the field and serve as the best source of elemental costs of 
TSPRs available.  Although the cost calculation listed in Table 3 is in FY 1997 dollars, 
the costs of each element as a percentage of the total cost of the TSPR are assumed to be 
constant since the process of PRs has not changed dramatically since 1997. (Cohen, 
2000)   Therefore, we can assume that Phase I elements share the same percentage of the 
TSPR cost today as they did in 1997.  Table 3 illustrates that Phase I data sources and 





Table 3.   TSPR Required Sources (Heuer, 2001) 
  
The remaining 41.6 percent of the total costs could be saved if every TSPR was 






Interview Sources ~FY97$   
Subject Interview 250.26 24.50% Phase I 
Listed References 132.04 12.93% Phase II 
Developed References 38.54 3.77% Phase II 
Residence Interviews 254.39 24.91% Phase II 
Employment References 163.07 15.97% Phase I 
Record Sources    
Local Agency Checks 41.40 4.05% Phase I 
National Agency Checks 
(NAC) 
17.73 1.74% Phase I 
Credit Records 1.30 0.13% Phase I 
Employment Records 59.15 5.79% Phase I 
Court Records 10.31 1.01% Phase I 
Other Checks 52.85 5.20% Phase I 
Total Case Cost 1021.04 100.00% Phase I  
    
Phase I Elements  58.40%  
Phase II Elements  41.60%  
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steady, DSS could expect approximately 64,000 TSPRs for FY03.  If every TSPR used 
only Phase I data sources, the savings could be as much as 41.6 percent of the of the cost 
of TSPR.  If we use the estimated cost of TSPR at $1,500, then as much as $624 could be 
saved for each TSPR conducted.  If all 64,000 TSPR used only the Phase I data sources, 
that would equate to an annual savings near $39,936,000.   
Because investigations deal with assessing the human behavior, it is reasonable to 
believe that not all TSPRs would qualify for the Phase I data sources only.  It is known 
from the Phased PR study that a significant number of people who have one or more 
issues will be detected by Phase I sources, which will trigger a complete investigation 
using Phase II sources. In addition, there will be a small percentage of people who will 
have Phase II sources checked at random to ensure that the relationship between Phase I 
and Phase II sources justify use of this Phased approach and that this relationship does 
not change over time.  Therefore, the Phased PR study recommended a more 
conservative and realistic number of people who will qualify for using only the Phase I 
data sources that was 60 to 70 percent of the total TSPRs, while the remaining 40 to 30 
percent would require both Phase I and II data sources to complete the TSPR.   
Second, the savings of 41.6 percent is the most optimistic estimate for savings.  
Because the DSS cost study used manpower estimates with actual costs for a given time 
period, the actual savings could vary greatly.  The Phased PR study considered that the 
41.6 percent savings per TSPR is the maximum savings and recommended a cost savings 
of 30 percent as an expected minimum for its calculation.   The Phased PR study 
recognized that not all TSPRs would qualify and not all savings can be realized with each 
TSPR.  Therefore, the minimum cost savings as proposed by the Phased PR would be the 
60 percent eligible multiplied by the 30 percent savings from the elimination of the Phase 
II elements for a total savings of about 18 percent of all the TSPR conducted.  That would 
be a savings of 270 dollars for every TSPR conducted annually, or based upon 64,000 
scheduled TSPRs it would save approximately 17.3 million dollars annually.   The upper 
threshold of savings could be as much as 27.9 million if as many as 70 percent of the 
TSPRs qualified for the 41. 6 percent savings.  Therefore the expected range of cost 
savings from the Phased PR is from 17.3 to 27.9 million dollars annually.  
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3.     Schedule  
The Phased PR Study showed that at least 18 percent of the resources spent on 
TSPRs could be saved if the Phase PR approach were used.  An alternative would be that 
Phased PRs could be accomplished 18 percent sooner.  An 18 percent savings in TSPR 
delivery time could be as much as 72 days savings on TSPR completion times.  This 
impact is especially important given the previous backlog cases sometimes sat without 
actions for periods exceeding 400 days. (IG, 2001)     
4.     Performance 
The Phased PR pilot study found that one case in 500 would not be properly 
reviewed by the adjudicators because the Phase I data sources did not reveal any evidence 
that Phase II would provide issue-relevant information, even though it was actually 
present.  In terms of personnel security, the one case in 500 may be an acceptable risk to 
the PSI process considering that none of the missed information resulted in a negative 
adjudication being taken.  The cost to identify this one case in 500 (or approximately 128 
cases a year based on an annual workload of 64,000 TSPRs) is the savings sacrificed by 
forgoing the use of the Phased PR approach.  This could be $17.28 million dollars for 
every 128 cases or $135,000 per additional case identified using the current PR approach.  
This decrease in the potential performance of using Phase PRs requires a risk 
management decision and rational application of limited resources by the policy decision 
makers.  
C. PROPOSED ACES PILOT STUDY ANALYSIS 
1.     Overview 
ACES is a stand alone software program that extracts information from federal 
and state public databases via electronic exchange, analyzes the information according to 
predefined selection criteria and notifies adjudicators at the CAFs of issue-relevant 
information on the subjects who were screened.  Currently, the ACES pilot study is 
defining the system requirements according to inputs from the CAF adjudicators.  The 
process and system requirements are discussed in Appendix J.     
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2.     Cost    
Cost elements of ACES are either direct or indirect.  Direct Costs are those 
associated directly with the development, test, operation and maintenance of the ACES 
system and interfaces.  This includes the personnel, hardware, software and overhead 
costs of the ACES program.  For the purposes of this analysis, these costs will remain 
relatively static with the assumption that the program management plan accurately 
reflects the scope and requirements that the ACES program will fulfill.   The direct costs 
are estimated in the ACES program management document with some elements 
contained in Appendix J.  
3.     Indirect Costs 
The indirect costs are those costs associated with ACES that are not covered in 
the ACES direct cost program budget.  These would include the costs for conducting the 
database checks not covered in the fee arrangement and the additional costs associated 
with the increased workload for the respective CAFs and investigative agencies.  All 
services that have personnel screened by ACES will have additional personnel screenings 
and adjudications that are not currently budgeted. Since the ACES product is delivered 
directly to the CAFs, the additional workload and subsequent costs for investigations by 
DSS will be passed directly onto the services. 
Indirect costs or impact costs for ACES will be driven by two major factors.  Two 
questions will address those factors, how many additional cases will ACES generate and 
what will be the final disposition of those new cases?   The impact costs of ACES are not 
represented in the management plan and these costs will be shared by external agencies 
including the CAFs and DSS in terms of resources needed to pay for the additional 
manpower required. 
a.     Schedule 
ACES will identify cases in addition to those identified by the current 
processes.  Calculating how many ACES cases will identify is determined in part by 
understanding how many people will be screened and the probability that any of those 
people screened will have issues detected by ACES.   According to the ACES program 
management plan, the first set of personnel to have their records screened will be the 
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personnel who hold Top Secret clearances and reach the 30 month anniversary from their 
last PR or SSBI, labeled in this analysis as Top Secret (Mid-Point) or TS-MP.  The 
second phase of the screening will advance to all Top Secret clearance holders on an 
annual basis, labeled in this analysis as Top Secret (Annual) or TS-A.  A third phase, 
which would be optional, would address personnel with Secret clearance who have 
reached their 60 month anniversary since their last PR or SSBI.  These will be labeled as 
Secret-Mid Point or Secret (MP).   The number of records screened is based upon the 
assumption that the total Top Secret population is approximately 500,000 personnel and 
the Secret population is approximately 2,000,000 personnel. (Timm, 2002)  In order to 
make the estimate more realistic, it is assumed that there is an annual attrition rate of 5 
percent of personnel.  This will account for personnel reassigned, terminated or otherwise 
not included in the screening.  The number of personnel included in the schedule of 
ACES screening is included in Appendix C.    
The databases ACES will access will eventually include those listed in Appendix 
A.  Other studies have relevant data pertaining to some of those same databases, namely 
the Source Yield Study and the Phased PR Study, which have issue “hit rate” data for 
actual subjects with actual clearances.  These studies also have adjudicative results of the 
cases identified as having issue-relevant information found in those databases.  For this 
analysis, the information contained in the databases will be examined with ACES-like 
selection criteria and sources, and the results will serve as an estimate of how many issue 
cases ACES would identify when screening records in those databases.  Hence, the 
Sources Yield Study database contains information relevant to the calculation of the 
preliminary ACES performance metrics.  It contains information on subjects who have 
been issued a final adjudication and can be used to help benchmark how many cases the 
ACES-like selection criteria and sources will identify.  Analyses were performed to 
identify how many issue cases were identified by the ACES-like sources alone using data 
acquired from the Phased PR study and selecting the data fields listed in Appendix D.  
For this analysis, ACES simulation screening was performed on data acquired for 
the Phase PR study.  The Phased PR study contained data on 1,611 DoD clearance 
holders, which was determined to be a large enough sample to meet the statistical 
requirement to provide a 99 percent confidence interval for the population of concern.  
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The ACES pilot study will sample approximately 15,000 records distributed over a 10-
month period.  The 1,611 person DoD sample used in the Phased Pilot study will be used 
to obtain preliminary estimates of the “hit rates” and adjudication outcome of those cases 
until more of the ACES pilot study data becomes available.  The Phased PR records are 
the best available source of data since they have final adjudication results and can be 
selected on the basis of the same record sources used by ACES.  Hence, not only will the 
analyses indicate the proportion of people having one or more issues using a set of 
records similar to the ones reviewed by ACES, but they will also reflect how those issues 
are likely to be handled by the CAFs. 
b.     Assumptions 
The cost drivers for the ACES cases can be divided into the costs to 
handle the cases by the CAFs and the costs to investigate the cases by DSS.  Once ACES 
identifies an issue-case, how the cases are handled or adjudicated will be a product of 
each service’s policies and procedures.  The handling procedures and investigative 
thresholds each agency chooses to act upon should be similar to the present methods.  For 
the purposes of this analysis we will assume that the ACES cases will be treated in the 
same manner as cases currently handled by the CAFs.   
In addition to the handling costs of the ACES cases, there are bound to be 
investigative costs also.  Because ACES will be identifying people who currently hold 
clearances who have issue-relevant information within their records, each case may 
require a Special Investigative Inquiry (SII.)  Each agency’s CAF can handle the ACES 
issue-cases in a number of ways including subject’s command involvement, security 
officer involvement or subject interviews, but invariably some ACES cases will require 
an SII.  This investigation is conducted by DSS, requires the most effort and resources, 
and serves as a good measure of the investigative costs the ACES cases may generate.   
Regardless of how the ACES cases are handled or dismissed, the case 
review will require additional resources from the CAF.  The serious cases will be 
investigated with an SII, while the less serious cases will be handled in a variety of other 
ways.  Because the serious cases will be investigated by DSS and are often be more 
complex in nature, it is reasonable to expect senior personnel to handle the reviews for 
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the CAF.  Therefore for this analysis the estimate of the salary costs for the CAF 
personnel will be based upon a Government Service Employee position 12, Step 5 with 
an annual salary of $56,619.  See Appendix H for the FY 2002 General Schedule.  The 
actual salary costs will be adjusted to reflect the full time benefits Government Service 
employees receive.  The loading factor is based upon the general and administrative 
figures calculated as a composite of support personnel costs, non-support personnel costs, 
and facility costs. (Crawford et al, 1991)  The loading factor of 52 percent is reasonable 
based upon current practices and will be used for this analysis. 
c.     How Many Aces Cases 
First, the number of issues identified by the ACES-like sources criteria 
listed in Appendix E was assessed using the Phased PR database.  The ACES-like 
sources identified 189 people of the 1,611 having at least one issue of concern addressed 
in the final adjudication.  The results are reported in Appendix F, and illustrate that 
ACES-like sources and selection criteria identified 11.7 percent of all the people in the 
Phased PR sample, each one having at least one issue of concern identified by those 
sources.  These 189 cases identified by ACES-simulated screening included 144 out of 
263 moderate to serious cases found in the Phased PR study.   The ACES-like sources, 
which are sources exclusively from public and commercial record databases, identified 
55 percent of all the cases that had moderate to serious issue-relevant information.  This 
proportion is considered impressive, because it did not include self-reported information 
included on the SF-86, which is one of the best sources of record-based information as 
identified in the Source Yield Study.  For purposes of this study, we will assume 12 
percent of the records screened by ACES will have at least one issue of concern.  This 
figure appears reasonable, because while the Phased PR study covered a five year interval 
compared to ACES midpoint checks which will cover a two and half year interval, the 
ACES checks will cover more databases.  It is believed the tow factors will be off-setting 
in nature. (Timm, 2002)  
d.     How Aces Cases Are Handled 
Second, the proportion of people having issues that were considered a 
moderate or major concern by adjudicators affects the workload categories, listed in 
Appendix G.  The fact that the ACES-like sources identified approximately 12 percent of 
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the sample as having at least one issue, but also that 75 percent of those people identified 
had issues that were of such severity to warrant a documented elevated level of concern 
will affect the investigator and adjudicator workloads.   If the level of severity level is 
high enough, then according to typical CAF policies many of these cases would be 
referred to DSS for a Special Investigative Inquiry (SII).  Based upon input from two 
subject matter experts, the percent of cases that will warrant an SII based upon similar 
severity and quantity of issues was set at 50 percent, which in both their opinions was the 
upper threshold of cases that would expand to SIIs. (Timm, 2002)  Realistically, not 
every serious case would require an SII and several will invariably be resolved through 
less costly measures.  This analysis will assume that 50 percent of the cases identified by 
ACES sources, as having one or more issues, will require an SII by DSS in order for the 
CAF to make a final adjudication. 
The SIIs initiated by the CAFs require DSS to conduct tailored follow-up 
investigations on the issues of concern.  The additional resources required to fully 
investigate the SII cases are reflected in the reported cost of SIIs.  DSS’ FY 2003 notional 
rates for SIIs are $1,342. (Draft Report, C3I, 2002)   For the purposes of this analysis, 
$1,342 will be the charge for each SII DSS is tasked to perform as a result of the CAFs’ 
request. 
e.     Handling/Adjudicative Costs   
According the ACES study plan, the CAFs will review each ACES 
generated case.  In certain cases, no further actions will be needed, such as when the 
issues reflected in the records are (a) considered too minor to warrant further actions, (b) 
the case pertains to someone other than the subject, or (c) the issues were already known 
or acted upon.  In other cases the matter might be resolved based upon discussions with 
the subject’s security manager, command or the subject himself.  In other cases the case 
will require an SII to properly investigate the issue of concern.  In each situation a 
subject’s case will need to be reviewed and adjudicated based upon the information 
available.   For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the CAFs will need about 
the same amount of time to adjudicate as they need to handle SSBI-PRs and Continuing 
Evaluation cases that contain issues of concern.   
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The handling, adjudication and appeals that result from negative 
adjudications will consume CAF resources. Using manpower data from the Consolidation 
of Personnel Security Adjudication in DoD Study, October 1991, we can estimate the 
number of hours required to handle an ACES generated cases.  Using the hours required 
to handle SSBI-PR and Continuing Evaluation cases that have issues, we can determine 
an estimate of the hours each ACES case with issues will take.  The manpower hours, 
listed in Appendix H, are weighted to accommodate regular issue cases and those that are 
appealed and require additional manpower during the appeal.   The weighted average 
hours per issue-TSPR case was 1.88 hours.  The weighted average across the CAFs for 
Continuing Evaluations Issue Cases was 1.32 hours. These figures were based upon the 
total number of cases handled by all the CAFs during the study period.  It was decided to 
base the number of hours required for adjudicators for each ACES issue case on the more 
conservative 1.88 hours per TSPR issue case. 
f.     Impact Costs  
Based upon the assumptions previously stated, the results of the indirect 
impact cost estimate calculations are listed below in Table 4.  The schedule of records to 
be screened was listed in the ACES program management plan and the results of the 
scheduled records to be screened are listed in Appendix L.  From these results, we can 
see that the major cost driver is the investigative costs of the DSS, which comprise nearly 
90 percent of the costs associated with the ACES impact, excluding direct and indirect 
ACES system costs.  
  The assumptions made during the analysis were based upon the available 




Table 4.   Summary of Estimated ACES Impact Costs from Appendix J. 
      4.     Schedule 
          By design the ACES program should require relatively few personnel to operate.  
The program management plan identifies personnel capable of operating the system.  The 
ACES process capitalizes on the automation factor and will provide nearly instantaneous 
results.  The development of the ACES process could incorporate automatic notification 
or issue detection for some of the databases used when the system matures.  The program 
is still in the development stage, and the full impact of how and when ACES checks will 
be accomplished is to be determined.   However, it’s most certain that the near real-time 
screening will be only a small part of the total ACES process and the ACES product and 
subsequent CAF involvement will be the drivers of the schedule.  How ACES is 
developed into the current PSI schedule will need to be addressed in subsequent studies. 
5.      Performance 
ACES performance is currently being tested with the ACES pilot study.  The 
analysis in this thesis provides a rough order of magnitude of the impact costs that ACES 
products will have on the PSI and adjudication systems.  If the performance assumptions 
hold similar to the ACES-like sources screened in the Phase PR study, then nearly 2.5 
percent of the people having one or more issues identified by ACES will require a 
corrective adjudication action against them.  This 2.5 percent figure will be tested in the 
ACES pilot study, but may indicate a rough performance improvement measure that 
ACES will provide.  If we consider that ACES will generate approximately 12 percent of 
the records with one or more issues, it is reasonable to believe some of those issues will 
result in a negative adjudication.  2.5 percent will serve as a benchmark figure to assess 
ACES potential performance in generating investigations that result in corrective 
Annual Costs (FY03$) TS Mid Point TS Annual Secret Mid-Point 
Records Screened 77,943 345,452 150,000 
DSS Impact Cost $6,275,192 $18,541,072 $19,775,712 
CAF Impact Costs  $851,972 $3,146,975 $2,685,351 
Total Impact Costs $8,586,800 $24,790,756 $24,476,364 
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adjudications as estimated in Table 5.  Issues that ACES identifies that result in 
corrective adjudication actions (e.g., warnings, monitoring programs, revocation of 
clearance) will be discovered before a subject’s next regularly scheduled PR.  If earlier 
detection is considered beneficial to the overall personnel security clearance program, 





 TS Mid Point TS Annual Secret Mid Point 
Cases Identified 9,352 32,329 30,000 
Cases Investigated 4,676 12,949 18,000 
Negative 
Adjudications 
234 808 750 
Table 5.   Estimated ACES Performance 
 
From the estimates in Table 5, ACES performance could identify as many as 808 
Top Secret cases that require corrective adjudication actions before the regularly 
scheduled PR.  This would mean that as many as 808 cleared individual would have some 





























V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.        CONCLUSIONS  
1.       Overview 
The objective of this thesis was to evaluate the personnel security initiatives that 
are being considered for introduction into the PSI process in terms of their costs, schedule 
and performance.  The analysis used the current PSI process and compared the pertinent 
terms of performance to the proposed solutions recommended by the Phased PR study 
and the ACES pilot study.  The processes used in the current PSI system were established 
and the performance measurements in terms of costs and schedules were determined 
based upon the available data.  The initiatives and the proposed changes to the PSI 
process were evaluated in terms of the costs and schedule they will impact upon the 
current PSI process. 
2.        Answers to Research Questions 
a.     What are the benefits to implementing Phased SSBI-PRs? 
 Based upon the research and review of the Phased PR Pilot Study, the 
benefit to implementation of the Phased PR is the substantial savings that can be attained 
by not always investigating sources that provide very little issue-relevant information.  
The savings that can be reaped by not conducting investigations that use the sources 
categorized as Phase II sources when there is no evidence found in the Phase I sources 
that doing so would be productive, saving an estimated 20 percent of the total cost of the 
PRs.  According to the estimates based upon expected costs of TSPR, this is an annual 
savings of nearly 20 million dollars.  The resources saved then can be reinvested into 
improving the PSI process.  Resources are being used for little marginal benefit based 
upon the results of the Phased PR study and the secondary analyses performed as part of 
this thesis. 
b.     What are the risks with Phased SSBI-PR? 
The primary risk associated the Phased PR is that in rare cases it would 
sacrifice some level of performance compared to the current PR process.   Although the 
data suggests that the loss of performance was minimal, with one case in 500 being 
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affected, the impact of mis-categorizing that one case depends on the nature of the issue 
that would have surfaced.  In all cases identified to date those issues have not resulted in 
any corrective adjudication actions being taken (such as warnings, suspensions, or 
revocations).  This fact allows us to rely on the Phase I sources as the primary sources to 
investigate, while only investigating the Phase II sources when evidence requires us to do 
so.  It is this researcher’s opinion, this would be the first attempt to apply a flexible 
standard of investigating subjects who have vastly different backgrounds and levels of 
inappropriate behavior surfaced.  The strict application of the investigation standards 
without regard to either the costs involved to conduct an investigation or the utility of its 
components is costly and unproductive.  The more dynamic approach to conducting 
investigations, applying fiscal stewardship and productivity assessments of various 
informational sources is a sensible approach to cost and risk management.  Blindly 
following the procedures when evidence suggests that there is no reason to do so is a poor 
use of scarce resources.  Moreover, expanding investigations when there is evidence 
suggesting a reason to do so, is a sensible approach to cost and risk management.  This is 
a first attempt at redefining a process that has stagnated on the side of caution and at the 
expense of the productivity and credibility of the investigation system.  
A secondary risk of implementing the Phased PR is dissolving interagency 
clearance and access reprocity.  Each security agency has its own set of standards for 
granting access to personnel to handle sensitive information.  Although the Phased PR 
may save resources, the marginal loss of issue-relevant cases, approximately 128 per 
year, may in some way compromise the perceived integrity of the PSI process.  All 
agencies that have clearance processes will have to accept that the DoD has this Phased 
PR process and accept that it is slightly less productive than the original PSI system.  
Currently every agency with clearance processes accepts the minimum federal standards 
for clearance investigations applicable to other agencies.  This allows for the exchange of 
information without requiring additional clearances at each governmental agency.  This 
reciprocity may be jeopardized if agencies external to DoD do not accept the Phased PR 
as a legitimate investigation alternative.  This could impact how DoD clearances are 





 c.     What are the benefits to implementing ACES? 
Because ACES uses automated data retrieval and screening, one of the 
benefits of ACES will provide will be the delivery of reports with issue-cases identified 
earlier than the current process.  The system is designed to require very little human 
intervention, which will lead to quicker identification of issues with personnel who hold 
clearances.  ACES will eventually be able to provide near-instantaneous reports on 
demand for CAFs and investigative agencies for personnel covered by the JPAS system 
(i.e., all DoD clearances holders). This extra level of automated screening will invariably 
identify issue-relevant cases earlier so that proper adjudication can take place and those 
deemed ineligible for handling classified information are removed sooner rather than 
later.    ACES has the potential to tap into data sources that are not currently being used 
and to provide Special Agents and adjudicators with information critical to their 
investigations and adjudications.  
d.     What are the risks with ACES? 
The system is new; it challenges the status quo and jeopardizes how 
business is currently being accomplished.  Therefore, it will have opponents.  Because the 
ACES program is under development it may have risks not yet identified.  Based on how 
the system is to operate, the most critical risk ACES has to address is the additional 
workload it may produce.  The additional screening ACES performs will ultimately add 
to the number of cases the investigators and adjudicators must handle.   Because ACES 
may have the capacity to generate more issue cases than the system can currently handle, 
it could overwhelm the current PSI system with issue cases that tax resources beyond 
their current limits.  The relative sensitivity within the DoD to investigation backlogs 
may jeopardize how many additional issue cases the system is willing to add regardless 
of how quickly they are identified.   
a. Can combining Phased PRs and ACES produce benefits that 
outweigh the  risks? 
            ACES is an extension to the improvement processes that DSS is trying to 
implement in part as a result of problems identified by the GAO.  ACES capitalizes on 
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the use of automated databases and automatic screening processes to identify cases of 
concern.  The impact of ACES could be far reaching as the performance it may provide 
could surpass any known screening technique available currently.  The ACES pilot study 
will flesh out the specific performance results, but based upon initial estimates it looks as 
though ACES will definitely generate additional cases for review by the CAFs and DSS.  
The direct and indirect costs of the ACES system can be supported by the estimated 
savings from the Phase PR, but based upon current estimates only for the Top Secret 
Mid-Point or Annual Checks.  The ACES impact costs may exceed the savings from the 
Phased PR if ACES is applied to both Top Secret clearance holders annually and to 
Secret clearance holders at mid-point.  Although the assumptions and estimates err on the 
conservative side there might not be sufficient funds from the Phased PR to cover all 
expenses associated with running annual TS and/or Secret level mid-point checks.  The 
additional cost ACES requires above the Phase PR savings may be worth the tradeoff 
when considering the performance ACES should deliver.  The Phase PR could mis-
categorize up to one case in 500, or an estimated 143 cases annually with few if any lost 
corrective actions, while ACES has the potential to generate as many as 700 cases each 
year that result in corrective adjudication action being taken.  The net tradeoff appears to 
favor the use of those resources saved from the PR process to be used on the ACES 
product.   
3.        Recommendations 
The PSI system has been in need of radical changes for quite some time. The 
credibility of the clearance system and the investigation process has been the subject of 
discussions.  The process needs new approaches and needs to incorporate flexible 
standards that allow for sensible application of standards to those cases that warrant it.  
Because the majority of cleared personnel have no issues, the PSI process needs to focus 
on those cases that do have issues and devote more resources to them.  Although the 
equitable application of the investigative standards is a noble venture required by current 
guidelines, the application of those standards without concern for cost and risk 
management analysis is a poor use of money. 
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4.        Area for Further Research 
The ACES pilot project will provide ample opportunity to determine the actual 
costs to the CAF and DSS.  This analysis used the available information and made 
various assumptions on how the PSI system would handle the ACES product.  The 
impact of ACES could be very profound and may change the way the PSI process is 
done.  This analysis is the first of many in the process improvement of the PSI system.  
Additional cost savings may be found in the removal of the employment interviews from 
the PR process.  They were the next least productive source and consumed a substantial 
amount of the investigative resources.  Additional research is possible on how the 
individual services and agencies will handle the ACES cases.  The cost and performance 
impact could have substantial effects on the resources those agencies apply to the 
investigation and adjudication of their employees.  Although ACES is still in an evolving 
stage of development, it may change how the screening process is accomplished by 
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APPENDIX A:     EXTERNAL DATABASES ACCESSED BY ACES  
DSS Case Control Management System (CCMS) Personal Information 
Credit Bureau Credit History Reports 
Real Estate  Property Owned 
FBI Criminal History Name Check, Warrants 
Bank Secrecy Act Reports Large Currency Transactions 
Suspicious Activity Reports Large Currency Transactions 
Customs Foreign Travel Passport ID, Alien ID, Travel 
INS I-94 Records Non-resident Alien Check 
DoD Personnel and Pay Records Administrative Actions 
OPM Federal Pay Records Calculations for Affluence 
DIBRS (Defense Incident Based Reporting System) Formal Incident Reporting 
Military Drug Test Results Drug Usage 
Military Child and Spouse Abuse Records Formal Complaints Filed 
Aircraft Ownership Calculations for Affluence 
Motor Vehicle Registration Records Calculations for Affluence 
State Boat Registration Records Calculations for Affluence 
Coast Guard Vessel Registration Calculations for Affluence 
PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) Local Criminal History 
National Driver Register Driver’s License Suspension 
Form 8300 IRS Large Cash Transactions 
OPM PSQ and Credit Records Financial History 
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APPENDIX  C: ESTIMATED ACES ELIGIBLE RECORDS 
Calculations based upon assumption that Top Secret clearance holders number 
500,000 personnel and new hiring keeps the population constant.  Secret clearance holder 
number 2,000,000 and is held constant through annual hiring 
 
TOP SECRET MID POINT ACES SCREENING ELIGIBLE: 
 
The number of people expected to undergo ACES midpoint checks during the 
first calendar year of ACES operations is 77,943.  That figure is based on the assumption 
that SSBIs and TS-PRs take approximately six months to complete, resulting in the 
proportion of the TS/SCI population who would reach their 30-month anniversary of 
completing their last SSBI or TS-PR during a given year being 1 out of 5.5 or 18.2 
percent.  Consequently, if no one ever retired, quit or was reassigned to less sensitive 
duties, 90,909 people (.182 X 500,000) would be expected to undergo midpoint checks.  
However, people do leave positions that require clearances for a variety of reasons.  A 5 
percent attrition rate was used to calculate the estimated number of people who would 
reach that 30-month post-investigation anniversary (90,909 X 0.95 X 0.95 X 0.95), which 
resulted in the estimate of 77,943.  
 
 
TOP SECRET ANNUAL ACES SCREENING ELIGIBLE: 
 
The number of people expected to undergo ACES annual checks during a typical 
calendar year of ACES operations is 345,452.  That figure is based on the assumption 
that SSBIs and TS-PRs take approximately six months to complete, resulting in the 
proportion of the TS/SCI population who would reach either their 12 month, 24 month, 
36 month or 48 month anniversary of completing their last SSBI or TSPR during a given 
year being 4 out of 5.5 or 72.7 percent.  Consequently, if no one ever retired, quit or was 
reassigned to less sensitive duties, 363,636 people (.727 X 500,000) would be expected to 
undergo annual checks.  However, people do leave positions that require clearances for a 
variety of reasons.  A 5 percent attrition rate was used to calculate the estimated number 
of people who would reach one of the aforementioned post-investigation anniversaries 
(363,636 X 0.95) with resulted in the estimate of 345,452. 
 
 
SECRET MID POINT ACES SCREENING ELIGIBLE: 
 
If each year 10% of the 2,000,000 Secret Clearances holders undergo a PR and we 
assume there is a 5% attrition rate, then at the 60 month point from Year 0, there will be 
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 APPENDIX D: ACES-LIKE SCREENING FACTORS 
 
Screening Source   Phase PR Data 
Credit Report   X 
Defense Clearance Investigation Index (DCII)   X 
FBI Headquarters Name Check   X 
Military Records   X 
Title 31:Large Currency Transaction Reports   X 
Public Records: Bankruptcies, Divorce, Court   X 
FBI Headquarters Criminal Check   X 
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APPENDIX E:  IDENTIFICATION OF CASE WITH ONE OR MORE 
ISSUES 
Statistics
credit ge 1 or dcii ge 1 or milit ge 1 or title_31 ge 1 or fbi_hq







credit ge 1 or dcii ge 1 or milit ge 1 or title_31 ge 1 or fbi_hq ge 1 or
fbi_name ge 1 or pub_rec ge 1 or f... (FILTER)
1422 88.3 88.3 88.3











Aces-like screening identified 11.7% of 1611 personnel with one or more issues 
of concern that was identified in the final adjudication. As discussed, this is a reasonable 
percentage to start.  If ACES expands to annual screening, the number of cases that have 
issues is expected to drop because of the periodicity between checks and earlier detection 
of issue-relevant information.  Conversely, the Secret Population is expected to have 
more cases identified with issue-relevant information than 12 percent for the Top Secrets 
population.  This analysis assumed 20 percent for the Secret population having at least 
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APPENDIX F:  MODERATE TO MAJOR SEVERITY 
Case Processing Summary
1611 100.0% 0 .0% 1611 100.0%
credit ge 1 or dcii ge
1 or milit ge 1 or
title_31 ge 1 or fbi_hq
ge 1 or fbi_name ge 1
or pub_rec ge 1 or f...
(FILTER) * OVR_SER




credit ge 1 or dcii ge 1 or milit ge 1 or title_31 ge 1 or fbi_hq ge 1 or fbi_name ge 1
or pub_rec ge 1 or f... (FILTER) * OVR_SER Crosstabulation
Count
1004 299 119 1422
45 144 189
1004 344 263 1611
Not Selected
Selected
credit ge 1 or dcii ge
1 or milit ge 1 or
title_31 ge 1 or fbi_hq
ge 1 or fbi_name ge 1










         ACES-like screening identified 55 percent of the cases that had moderate to major 
level issues of concern in the final adjudication of the cases.   If ACES expands to annual 
screening, the number of cases that require expansion into SII is expected to drop because 
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APPENDIX H: ANNUAL GOVERNMENT SALARY (FY 2002) 
STEP INCREASES 
 
GS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 14757 15249 15740 16228 16720 17009 17492 17981 18001 18456 
2 16592 16985 17535 18001 18201 18736 19271 19806 20341 20876 
3 18103 18706 19309 19912 20515 21118 21721 22324 22927 23530 
4 20322 20999 21676 22353 23030 23707 24384 25061 25738 26415 
5 22737 23495 24253 25011 25769 26527 27285 28043 28801 29559 
6 25344 26189 27034 27879 28724 29569 30414 31259 32104 32949 
7 28164 29103 30042 30981 31920 32859 33798 34737 35676 36615 
8 31191 32231 33271 34311 35351 36391 37431 38471 39511 40551 
9 34451 35599 36747 37895 39043 40191 41339 42487 43635 44783 
10 37939 39204 40469 41734 42999 44264 45529 46794 48059 49324 
11 41684 43073 44462 45851 47240 48629 50018 51407 52796 54185 
12 49959 51624 53289 54954 56619 58284 59949 61614 63279 64944 
13 59409 61389 63369 65349 67329 69309 71289 73269 75249 77229 
14 70205 72545 74885 77225 79565 81905 84245 86585 88925 91265 
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APPENDIX I: COMPENSATION LOADING FACTOR 
 
THIS 52 PERCENT REPRESENTS THE ADDITIONAL COSTS 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE CAF FUNCTIONS NOT COVERED IN THE SALARY 
CALCULATIONS.  THIS IS THE ADDITIONAL LOADING FACTOR ASSUMED IN 
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APPENDIX J: ACES SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
1. OVERVIEW 
The ACES pilot program has multiple purposes, but specifically it will screen 
public and commercial records of personnel who hold security clearances within DoD.  
The system will identify personnel who have issue-relevant information of interest to the 
pilot CAF adjudicators that was not previously noted on the last PR.  Second, the ACES 
pilot will identify the number of cases in which it identified personnel with issues of 
concern that would have not have otherwise come to the attention of the adjudicators.  
Third, the pilot study will attempt to identify cases in which ACES software failed to 
identify issues present that adjudicators considered of interest.  The project’s intent is to 
identify personnel having security issues of concern earlier than would have been 
possible under the current PR standards, by using automated data sources and screening 
software requiring minimal human intervention.   
The intent of ACES is to use automated sources and evaluation processes to 
screen records earlier and faster.  This allows current clearance holders to be screened 
using automated sources ahead of the regularly scheduled PR.   This means in most cases 
issue-relevant information will be found earlier than normal and, secondly, some portion 
of those screened would have been attritions before their regularly scheduled PR.  This 
group of clearance holders will now be subject to ACES screening to help monitor their 
security relevant behaviors, whereas they would have had only the initial investigation 
and never been subject to a PR.  Additionally, identifying issue-relevant information may 
lead to better investigations and interventions due to the recency of the information.    
The ACES pilot study intent is to determine how many additional issue cases are 
identified by the ACES program and validate the value of the program with the CAFs.  
The increased workload on the CAFs could be a significant drain on limited resources if 
the ACES identifies a substantial number of issue cases.  This drain would continue 
unless adjudicators modified the criteria they established for use by ACES or were 
staffed for the increased workload. 
 
2. SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS 
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The development and testing of ACES is being be conducted by PERSEREC with 
the assistance of Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) program office, the Air 
Force Central Adjudication Facility, and the Defense Intelligence Agency Central 
Adjudication Facility.  The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (S&IO) is the primary 
decision authority regarding matters pertaining to ACES.  ACES will have several 
elements that drive the process.  The system is comprised of data sources, data 
evaluation, ACES product and program management.  In order to determine the cost of 
ACES, we need to understand the elements. 
a.     Data Sources 
       The first element is obtaining access and interface with the federal, state and 
commercial databases.  The pilot study is currently accessing databases on an incremental 
basis to test the interface between the data records and the ACES software.  Once the 
interface is finalized, the databases will be accessed by ACES on demand.  Information 
contained in the various databases populates fields within the ACES software and the 
ACES program evaluates that data.  Access to some of the data sources requires either 
yearly fees or per case charges.  The pilot study will determine the optimum interface and 
subsequently the final arrangement for access costs.  The cost assessment will exclude the 
pilot study effort as part of the final costs to access data.  ACES will eventually access 
approximately 18-22 separate databases.   The databases ACES will access are listed in 
Appendix A.   
b.     Data Evaluation 
        Once the data has been extracted from the individual databases, the ACES 
software compiles the data and generates a report based upon the data received.  The core 
system is an Oracle 8i database that will run on a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
Solaris 8 operating system.  The commercial software allows for flexibility to access 
various databases with the use of two COTS dynamic link libraries.  The system will 
generate HTML output for eventual delivery to customers via the secure internet.  
Various security arrangements with the database host and ACES program will dictate 
how the system is eventually accessed remotely.  The central operations center will be at 
the Defense Manpower Data Center West (DMDC-West) in Seaside, CA.  DMDC will be 
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the primary system administrators with responsibilities outlined in the ACES program 
management plan (PMP.) 
c.     Aces Product 
       The ACES product will be a prioritized list of subjects who have data within 
the various databases listed in Appendix A that is of some interest to the respective 
CAFs.  The ACES report will be delivered to the CAFs for disposition.  The CAFs will 
take the ACES output and determine whether additional action needs to happen.  The 
action taken by the CAF will be dependent on the information found within the ACES 
report and could vary greatly.  A sample ACES output is contained in Appendix B. 
d.     Cost Estimation 
        This thesis will attempt to identify the cost of the ACES program in terms of 
direct and indirect costs.   The preliminary tests of ACES and simulated data screenings 
with ACES-like selection criteria will serve as a rough estimate of what to expect in term 
of additional cases.  If ACES generates additional cases to be screened, there will 
invariably be additional cost to the CAFs and DSS to handle the new cases.  Both the 
CAFs and DSS need to be aware of the additional requirement they may face with an 
introduction of ACES into the PSI process.  Although the ACES pilot study is in 
progress, the analysis presented in this thesis will attempt to place an estimate on the 
impact costs to the CAFs and DSS using assumptions based upon current policies, 
practices and procedures.  Data from the various DSS and CAF studies will be used to 
ascertain how the CAFs and DSS will handle the additional ACES cases.  The final 
results of the ACES pilot study are of interest to any agency that has cleared personnel 
and has interest in either how the potential increase in performance (e.g., more issues 
detected, issue detected sooner and less manual intervention of clean cases) ACES may 
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APPENDIX K:  DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS  
In order to understand the terminology used by the Defense Security Service, 
selected terms used in this report are listed in alphabetical order along with their 
definitions and abbreviations. 
1. ACES – Automated Continuing Evaluation System, an automated system that 
gathers information from public and commercial databases and analyzes the 
results according to predefined selection criteria.  The ACES product will be a 
list of personnel that have issues of concern as a result of the screening of the 
databases and the reports and records associated with those checks. 
2. Adjudication – The process used by the adjudicator to analyze positive and 
derogatory information obtained in a personnel security investigation.  Its 
purpose is to reconcile the information with established standards for granting 
a security clearance. (Hill, 1991) 
3. Adjudicator – A person who evaluates the information gathered by a 
personnel security investigation and determines whether or not to grant a 
clearance or continuation of a clearance. 
4. Case Control Management System (CCMS) – An automated system that 
controls the workflow of the investigations within DSS.  The system tracks 
the individual and the various work required to complete an investigation for 
the appropriate CAF final review. 
5. National Agency Check – A search of the indexes and files of appropriate 
federal agencies including the FBI investigative and criminal history, the 
Office of Personnel Management Security/Suitability Investigation Index 
(SSI), the Department of Defense Defense Clearance and Investigation Index 
(DCII) and other national agencies that may have information bearing on the 
loyalty, trustworthiness, and suitability of individuals under the investigative 
jurisdiction of the Department of Defense (DoD.) (Cohen, 2000)  
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6. National Agency Check with Local Agency and Credit Checks (NACLC) – A 
search of the indexes and files contained within a NAC with additional 
inquiries into credit bureau and local law enforcement checks covering places 
where the applicant has resided, worked or gone to school within the past five 
years. 
7. Periodic Reinvestigation (PR) – An investigation required every five years for 
personnel with Top Secret clearances (TSPR, TS-SSBI-PR), or ten years for 
personnel with Secret or Confidential clearances (S-PR or C-PR) for the 
purpose of determining an individual’s continued eligibility for access to 
classified information.  TSPRs, also known as Single Scope Background 
Investigations-Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR), have the same 
requirements as those for an initial SSBI with the following exceptions: (a) 
NAC is not required on spouse or cohabitant if completed in initial, (b) no 
educational review required, (c) employment verified since last investigation 
only, (d) only two references and neighbors must be interviewed, (e) Treasury 
Department’s financial data is checked for the period covering the period 
while the person held a security clearance. (Cohen, 2000)  
8. Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) – PSIs are required to determine an 
individuals suitability to handle classified material.  They also include 
investigating allegations that arise subsequent to adjudicative actions.   
9. Phased Periodic Reinvestigation (Phased PR) – The result of the Phase PR 
study, where the Periodic Reinvestigation (PR) is applied in phases beginning 
with of Phase I sources.  If no evidence of misconduct is found in Phase I 
sources, the PR is completed and sent to the CAF for review and adjudication.  
If derrogatory evidence is found in the Phase I sources, then a complete PR is 
conducted using all the data sources in Phase I and Phase II. 
10. Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) – Established by National 
Security Directive 63 in December 1991 to replace the Background 
Investigation (BI) and the Special Background Investigation (SBI) the 
investigation covers the last ten years of a subject’s life.  It includes a detailed 
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interview with the subject, (SI), (b) NAC with fingerprints, (c) verification of 
U.S. Citizenship, (d) independent birth, education, employment and military 
history, (e) interview with four references, former spouses, employers, 
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APPENDIX L: IMPACT COST OF ACES 
TOP SECRET MID-POINT & ANNUAL ACES CHECKS 
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SECRET MID-POINT ACES CHECKS 
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